NON-PUBLIC?: N
ACCESSION #: 8904260179
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME: H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
PAGE: 1 OF 3

DOCKET NUMBER: 05000261

TITLE: REACTOR TRIP DUE TO INADVERTENT CLOSURE OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE
EVENT DATE: 03/22/89 LER #: 89-005-00 REPORT DATE: 04/18/89

OPERATING MODE: N POWER LEVEL: 100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR SECTION
50.73(a)(2)(iv)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:
NAME: DAVID COOK-SENIOR SPECIALIST,
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TELEPHONE: 803-383-1179

COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION:
CAUSE: SYSTEM: COMPONENT: MANUFACTURER:
REPORTABLE TO NPRDS:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: NO

ABSTRACT:

On March 22, 1989, with Unit No. 2 operating at one hundred percent (%) power, a reactor trip occurred due to the inadvertent closure of a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), which isolated flow from "A" Steam Generator. All plant systems performed as designed throughout the event, and the plant was stabilized using emergency operating procedures. The NRC Operations Center was notified of the event in accordance with 10CFR50.72 at 0256 hours via the ENS. The event is attributed to personnel error on the part of the licensed Control Operator who manipulated the incorrect switch during the performance of a surveillance test. The Control Operator has been disciplined for inattention to detail. Additionally, the human factors aspects associated with the event are being reviewed. This LER is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

END OF ABSTRACT

I. Description Of Event

On March 22, 1989, Unit No. 2 was operating at one hundred percent (%) power.1 Licensee Operations personnel were concurrently performing scheduled surveillance tests OST-202, "Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Components Test", and EST-013, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Bearing Temperature Test". OST-202 required closing valve MS-Vl-8C, "C" Steam Generator supply to the Steam Driven AFW Pump, to stop the pump. The licensed Control Operator performing the tests mistakenly manipulated the switch for Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Vl-3A instead, isolating main steam flow from "A" Steam Generator. Upon receipt of steam generator alarms, the Control Operator immediately attempted to re-open the MSIV to prevent a reactor trip. The MSIV did not re-open, and the reactor received a trip signal at 0220 hours from a low-low level on "A" Steam Generator. Emergency operating procedures were utilized to stabilize the plant, and all systems performed as designed. The NRC was notified of this event at 0256 hours via the ENS pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).

II. Cause of Event

This event is attributed to personnel error on the part of the Control Operator. The switch on the Reactor Turbine Generator Board (RTGB) utilized to shut the SDAFW valve MS-V1-8C is located to the immediate left of the Main Steam Isolation Valve V1-3A, is similar in appearance, and is similar in labeling nomenclature. The Operator mistakenly manipulated the incorrect switch to secure the SDAFW Pump. A contributing cause was that the procedures used to perform the surveillance tests contained discrepancies regarding the length of time the SDAFW pump could run on minimum flow recirculation. While OST-202 stated that, under this condition, the pump run time shall not exceed thirty (30) minutes, EST-013 stated that the pump should be run for at least thirty (30) minutes.

This placed additional pressure on the Operator to ensure the SDAFW pump run time was not in violation of either procedure, which may have diverted his attention to proper switch operation.

III.Analysis of Event

A. Reason Reportable This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event which resulted in the automatic actuation of an engineered safety feature.

B. Safety Assessment

All plant systems performed as designed throughout the event. Other than causing an unnecessary challenge to the Reactor Protection System, the reactor trip had no impact on plant safety.

1/H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 is a Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plant in commercial operation since March, 1971.

Subsequent to the event, the valve manufacturer was consulted for guidance, and the "A" MSIV externals were inspected. The valve was tested and found to be operating properly.

IV. Corrective Action

The Control Operator was disciplined for inattention to detail. The human factors aspects associated with the proximity of the affected switches on the RTCB are being reviewed as part of the Corrective Action Program process. The surveillance procedures used for SDAFW pump testing are being revised to ensure compatibility when they are performed concurrently. In addition, as a precautionary measure and after discussion with the MSIV vendor, the MSIV internals are scheduled to be inspected during a future outage.

V. Additional Information

A. Failed Component Identification There were no failed components applicable to this event.

B. Previous Similar Events
No previous events have occurred similar to the event described by this report.

CP&L
Carolina Power & Light Company

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT
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APR. 18 1989

Robinson File No: 13510C Serial: RNPD/89-1301

(10 CFR 50.73)

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 88-005-00

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 and NUREC-1022 including Supplements No. 1 and 2.

Very truly yours,

R.E. Morgan
General Manager
H. B. Robinson S. E. Plant
RDC:bah

nclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter
Mr. L. W. Garner
INPO

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